Torture by Iraqi Militias: The Report Washington Did Not Want You to See

By Ned Parker, Reuters

14 December 15


Two unpublished investigations show that the United States has consistently overlooked killings and torture by Iraqi government-sponsored Shi'ite militias.

It was one of the most shocking events in one of the most brutal periods in Iraq’s history. In late 2005, two years after the U.S.-led invasion toppled Saddam Hussein, U.S. soldiers raided a police building in Baghdad and found 168 prisoners in horrific conditions.

Many were malnourished. Some had been beaten.

The discovery of the secret prison exposed a world of kidnappings and assassinations. Behind these operations was an unofficial Interior Ministry organisation called the Special Investigations Directorate, according to U.S. and Iraqi security officials at the time. 

The body was run by militia commanders from the Badr Organisation, a pro-Iran, Shi’ite political movement that today plays a major role in Baghdad’s war against Islamic State, the Sunni militant group. 

Washington pressured the Iraqi government to investigate the prison. But the findings of Baghdad’s investigation – a probe derided by some of its own committee members at the time as a whitewash – were never released. 

The U.S. military conducted its own investigation. But rather than publish its findings, it chose to lobby Iraqi officials in quiet for fear of damaging Iraq’s fragile political setup, according to several current and former U.S. military officials and diplomats.

Both reports remain unpublished. Reuters has reviewed them, as well as other U.S. documents from the past decade. 

The documents show how Washington, seeking to defeat Sunni jihadists and stabilise Iraq, has consistently overlooked excesses by Shi’ite militias sponsored by the Iraqi government. The administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama have both worked with Badr and its powerful leader, Hadi al-Amiri, whom many Sunnis continue to accuse of human rights abuses. 

Washington’s policy of expediency has achieved some of its short-term aims. But in allowing the Shi’ite militias to run amok against their Sunni foes, Washington has fueled the Shia-Sunni sectarian divide that is tearing Iraq apart. 

The decade-old U.S. investigation of the secret prison implicates officials and political groups in a wave of sectarian killings that helped ignite a civil war. It also draws worrying parallels to the U.S. government’s muted response today to alleged abuses committed in the name of fighting Islamic State. 

Those accused of running the secret prison or of helping cover up its existence include the current head of the Iraqi judiciary, Midhat Mahmoud, Transport Minister, Bayan Jabr, and a long revered Badr commander popularly referred to as Engineer Ahmed. 

“Special Investigations Directorate personnel illegally detained, tortured and murdered Iraqi citizens,” the U.S. report states. “Iraqi government officials failed to take action to stop the crimes.” 

The report says U.S. investigators faced a “lack of government cooperation, reluctance of witnesses to come forward and the perception of official complicity.” 

Judge Mahmoud declined to comment for this story. A former colleague close to him said Mahmoud knew about the secret prison’s existence but did not know what went on there: “He cannot be held responsible for every judge’s behaviour.” 

Transport Minister Jabr did not respond to Reuters’ queries. Jabr has previously stated publicly that no wrongdoing occurred at the prison. 

A senior Badr official told Reuters that the prison allegations were part of a smear campaign by terrorists. He called for the international media to focus on Islamic State, which has carried out suicide bombings and executed prisoners. 

U.S. officials acknowledge the role that Shi’ite militias such as Badr play in fighting Islamic State. As the Hashid Shaabi, or Popular Mobilisation Forces, the militias helped Baghdad defend the country against the Sunni jihadist group when Iraqi military and police divisions deserted en masse in 2014. 

Since then, the militias have continued to attack Islamic State, which has declared a Caliphate across swathes of Iraq and Syria. Islamic State, also known as Daesh, routinely executes citizens who speak against it, kidnaps people, buys and sells women and children, and uses rape as a weapon. 

American ambassador Stuart Jones told Iraqi state television in April this year “that the Hashid Shaabi is part of the Iraqi fighting forces which are defeating Daesh today.” 

But Sunnis in areas freed from Islamic State control say the Shi’ite militias have been guilty of their own excesses, including looting, abductions and murder. At least 718 Sunnis in Salahuddin province have been abducted by fighters from Shi’ite militias since April 2015, according to several security officers, a provincial council member and tribal leaders. Only 289 have been freed, most after paying ransoms. 

Some former and current U.S. officials say Washington needs to stop downplaying abuses by the Shi’ite militias. 

Robert Ford, a former U.S. diplomat who served as the U.S. embassy’s political officer between 2004 and 2006, believes the U.S. government’s decision not to punish those behind the secret prison set a damaging precedent. “A few people were transferred elsewhere,” he said. “That’s not a punishment. You are supposed to scare them into not doing it.” 

Ten years ago, Ford said, the militias were armed groups with political agendas, or the armed wings of political factions. “Now … the Prime Minister’s office has called them an official institution, and they receive resources directly from the state as well as a degree of political legitimacy.” 

A Badr official, Muen al-Kadhimi, dismissed recent allegations of kidnapping, looting and killing. “We do not violate the human rights and we should not forget the inhumane ways practised by the enemy of the Iraqi people,” Kadhimi told Reuters. 

The Iraqi government conceded there has been a problem with kidnapping around Iraq, even in Baghdad, sometimes by men in security uniforms. “The Iraqi government is working hard to fight this,” said Saad Hadithi, a spokesman for Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi. He blamed “gangs” for the attacks, but said the state had “no concrete evidence of who is behind it.” 

The U.S. embassy in Iraq and the State Department’s new counter-terrorism envoy, Brett McGurk, did not respond to requests for comment. 

THE MESS 

The Badr group spent years in exile in Iran. Its parent organisation, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (ISCI), was the most powerful Shi’ite political force in Iraq. 

After Saddam’s fall, Washington hoped ISCI and Badr would be reliable partners for the security forces, which Badr members joined in large numbers. But despite claims that they had demobilised after their return to Iraq, Badr’s fighters did not disarm, U.S. army intelligence officers say. Instead, they began to assassinate former Iraqi officers, influential Baath party members and civil servants. 

Colonel Derek Harvey, a retired intelligence officer, told Reuters that the U.S. military detained Badr assassination teams possessing target lists of Sunni officers and pilots in 2003 and 2004 but did not hold them. Harvey said his superiors told him that “this stuff had to play itself out” – implying that revenge attacks by returning Shi’ite groups were to be expected. He also said Badr and ISCI offered intelligence and advice to U.S. officials on how to navigate Iraqi politics.

After Shi’ite religious parties swept to victory in elections in 2005, Badr and ISCI were given control of the Interior Ministry. The U.S. embassy publicly backed the move. But James Jeffrey, the top U.S. diplomat at the time and later ambassador to Iraq, was alarmed when Bayan Jabr, a Badr ally, became minister. “Bayan Jabr was the biggest mistake I made,” Jeffrey told Reuters. “His file was terrible.” 

Jabr appointed Badr members to senior Interior Ministry posts. They created the covert Special Intelligence Directorate, which current and former U.S. officials believe coordinated the killing of former Saddam-era officials. Within months, Sunni politicians reported a sharp increase in the abduction of Sunni men. Some Sunnis blamed men in police uniforms. Corpses began to turn up around Baghdad. 

The violence raised tensions between the U.S. military and officials in the U.S. embassy. Diplomats wanted those behind the killings brought to justice. Military officials were more prepared to turn a blind eye. 

One U.S. diplomat said senior staff from the Iraqi security forces training command – then run by General David Petraeus – refused a U.S. embassy request for information on Iraqi troop movements in areas where Sunnis had been kidnapped. The diplomat said a senior staffer from the command told him privately: “At least they (the Iraqi security services) are getting the right guys.” 

Petraeus told Reuters this month he had been concerned about the abuses and raised the issue with the Iraqi government and General George Casey, then head of the U.S. military in Iraq. Petraeus said that at the time the “responses were inadequate, in my assessment.” 

Casey said the U.S. military set up a unit to monitor sectarian violence the month Petraeus left. “We leaned hard on our advisers … to provide actionable evidence,” Casey said. “Easier said than done. We had a very difficult time finding a smoking gun.” 

According to Ford, General Martin Dempsey, who succeeded Petraeus, ordered his officers not to talk with U.S. diplomats about Iraqi security forces’ involvement in the killings. 

Dempsey declined to comment. 

Casey said his officers did their best “to prevent, stop and report any illegal or immoral acts by Iraqi forces.”

THE PRISON

Tensions exploded into the open in November 2005 when U.S. General Karl Horst, operations officer in Baghdad, received a tip that a missing Sunni teenager was being held in a secret Interior Ministry prison.

Horst raided the police building, in the Baghdad neighbourhood of Jadriya. The troops did not find the teenager but discovered the 168 detainees. 

Washington faced a problem. The U.S. military in Iraq was battling Sunni radicals and the Shi’ite Mahdi Army movement. Badr was one of the few Iraqi forces not actively opposed to the Americans. But now, with what had become known as the Jadriya bunker, the militia had been directly linked to the bloodshed tearing Iraq apart.

 U.S. officials pushed the Iraqis to investigate and submitted evidence directly to Ibrahim al-Jaafari, the prime minister. “‘He said there was nothing he could do,” Ford said.

Pressed by the Americans, Jaafari created an investigative committee. Its findings were never released. Jaafari, now Iraq’s foreign minister, did not respond to requests for comment. 

The committee’s report, reviewed by Reuters, absolves the country’s security services and all government officials. Instead the Iraqi investigative committee said “Baathist” police had treated the prisoners badly. 

Disappointed, Casey launched his own probe. The findings of that investigation, led by a U.S. military intelligence taskforce, were submitted to Casey in February 2006. 

The U.S. report implicates Interior Minister Jabr and the Iraqi chief justice, Mahmoud. It also blames two men who ran the prison: Badr’s intelligence chief at the time, Bashar Wandi, who went by the name Engineer Ahmed; and a second Badr official, Brigadier General Ali Sadiq.

According to the U.S. report, Jabr was "complicit" and "indirectly responsible for illegal detentions, abuse, torture and extra-judicial killings." It said he had "failed to act on multiple reports of abuse and torture in the bunker" and called his conduct “an act of omission.” 

The U.S. military report states Mahmoud “was briefed regarding problems” at the prison by some of his judges and “took no steps to correct them.” 

Mahmoud’s cooperation with the prison’s security officials “was required to assign judges who would ignore the rights of detainees, making him complicit,” the report says. 

Despite calls from anti-corruption protesters in Baghdad for Mahmoud to be fired, the judge remains in post. In 2010, his office assigned investigative judges to interrogate detainees in another secret Baghdad prison. This second prison was run by the office of then Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and held more than 400 Sunni men from the city of Mosul. Some of the judges were implicated in torturing the detainees. 

The U.S. report said Engineer Ahmed “had knowledge” of “illegal detentions, abuse and torture and concealed them from others.” His deputy, Ali Sadiq, was “directly responsible for illegal detentions, abuse, torture and extra-judicial killings.” 

A separate internal U.S. military biography of Engineer Ahmed, produced later, said he answered directly to Hadi al-Amiri, the Badr boss. The biography called Ahmed “one of the most dangerous men in Iraq,” who led the “cruelest and most dangerous armed groups of the Badr Brigade while using … equipment, cars and uniforms from the Interior Ministry.” 

Ahmed retained his position in the Interior Ministry for 18 months after the prison episode. The Badr organisation says he retired five years ago. But a U.S. military official and a former Iraqi security official say he continues to be in charge of Badr’s intelligence operations. An Iraqi lawmaker described him as high-ranking in Badr. 

Reuters was unable to reach Ahmed or Ali Sadiq. Badr chief Amiri did not respond to requests for comment. 

Badr official Kadhimi blamed the prison controversy on Sunnis opposed to the Shi’ite government. “The terrorists initiated this slander campaign,” he said. 

LONG-TERM PROBLEM? 

In February 2006, days after General Casey received the U.S. military’s investigation of the first prison, Sunni militants blew up a Shi’ite shrine in Samarra. The attack triggered a full-scale civil war. Casey delivered the report to Jaafari, but said the prime minister, who was fighting to stay in office after national elections a few months earlier, had “no incentive to act” and resisted pressure. 

“Theoretically we could have punished someone, but the judgment was, ‘Let’s push the (Iraqi) government to do it,’” said Zalmay Khalilzad, U.S. ambassador at the time. “When the government failed to, we pushed for a change in the leadership.” 

When Iraq’s new government was formed in May 2006, Jaafari was removed as prime minister and Jabr became finance minister. Khalilzad said the changes halted the growth of the Shi’ite militias’ influence inside the police, and the U.S. military started taking the worst national police units off the streets for retraining. 

But other diplomats, Iraqi officials and U.S. military officers say the militias were so deeply embedded in the police and army that extra-judicial killings carried on until late 2007 and only faded out following an intensive U.S. troop build-up led by Petraeus, who had returned to Iraq earlier that year as the U.S. commander. 

The people who paid the ultimate price were the secret prison’s detainees. A former Iraqi official told Reuters that at least 10 prisoners were killed following their release. One bunker survivor still fears for his security. He does not believe any lessons were learned from the episode. “The militias play free,” he told Reuters. 

As the militias have played a growing role defending Iraq against Islamic State, their popularity has surged among the country’s Shi’ite population. 

Americans have also applauded the Shi’ite paramilitaries victories. Jeffrey, the former ambassador who has now retired, said he did not worry last year when Islamic State swept across Sunni areas because he was confident that the Kurds and Amiri, the Badr boss, would join the battle. "(Amiri) is a radical revolutionary bloodthirsty killer,” Jeffrey said. “I like people who fight.” 

In October, counter-terrorism envoy McGurk tweeted his congratulations to the Iraqi security forces and the militias after they seized the town of Baiji and its oil refinery from Islamic State.  

In private, though, some U.S. military officers raise concerns. One senior U.S. military officer said he worries that the militias now control entire provinces. “Without real reconciliation, the Sunnis will stay angry and Islamic State will continue to gain support,” he said. 

Ryan Crocker, who was U.S. ambassador in Iraq in 2007 at the height of the civil war, believes Amiri and his peers are now more powerful than the Iraqi military. “The more they assert themselves on the battlefield, the more they become the real power in the land, and the weaker Prime Minister Abadi gets,” Crocker said.

 

Washington’s strategy of air strikes against Islamic State combined with turning a blind eye to Shi’ite excesses is cementing the militias’ power and helping break Iraq into its religious and ethnic parts, he said. "Our short-term solution is creating a greater long-term problem.”

Iraq--Background and History

Iraq--Background and History

Based on the book, Blockade & Destruction of Iraq by Mohammed Alomari, 2002, with few updates 

September 25, 2015
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Country Profile

Iraq, a country about the size of California, is located in the southwestern portion of Asia known as the Middle East. Iraq has a very small coastline (58 km) at the head of the Arabian Gulf, located in the southern tip of the country. Iraq is bordered on the east by Iran, on the north by Turkey, to the west by Syria and Jordan, and to the south by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
Iraq has two natural flowing rivers, the famous Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, which meet together in the south to form another waterway known as Shatt-al-Arab. Iraq also has small lakes in the center of the country as well as mountainous regions in the north. The central and southern portions are for the most part flatlands. The southwestern portion of the country is mostly arid and essentially a desert.

History

Historically, Iraq has been the center of some of the most ancient civilizations in the world. Iraq was also the home of two major Biblical/Quranic prophets, Noah and Abraham.
The name, Iraq, literally means in Arabic, “the land between two rivers.” The first recorded history of the use of the name of Iraq to the country is in the early 630’s AD when the Islamic caliphs began referring to the area as Iraq.

Earlier (pre-Islamic) historians based their writings on the ancient Greek writers who referred to Iraq as “Mesopotamia,” which in Greek also meant, “land between two rivers.”
Prior to the ancient Greek civilization, the Iraq was referred to by the names of the various civilizations.

The ancient history of Iraq goes back to about 7,000 years ago, around 5,000 BC to the Sumerian civilization. The Sumerians had a collection of many different city-states in the southern plains of Iraq.

The Sumerians are credited for many of the inventions we take for granted today, such the invention of the wheel, which all modern land transportation depends on today. The Sumerians also divided the day into 24 hours, and the hour into 60 minutes and the minute into 60 seconds. In addition, the Sumerians are credited for having the oldest known written language, known as cuneiform.

The Sumerians were later succeeded by the Akkadian civilization. The Akkadian period is also sometimes referred to as the Sumerian-Akkadian civilization, because it combined the high culture and scientific achievements of the Sumerians with the military nature of the Akkadians. The Akkadians concentrated on military conquests and forged an empire around in and around Iraq. The most renowned Akkadian king was Sargon I.

The Akkadians were later succeeded by the Babylonians, who came from the southern Iraqi city of Babylon. During this early Babylonian period, the civilization became known for the arts and sciences. One famous Babylonian king, Hammurabi, was the first ruler to publish laws for all the citizens to read. The written law gave the citizens an opportunity to publicly learn about the laws, rather than live in fear of what may or may not please the ruler.

Later the Babylonians were succeeded by the Assyrians who came from the northern Iraqi city of Ashur. The Assyrian Empire was much more militaristic than the early Babylonian period. The Assyrians established a sizeable empire in and around Iraq. One of the most famous Assyrian kings was Sargon II.

Later, the Babylonians were able to fight off the Assyrians, and successfully destroyed the Assyrian Empire. Although the second Babylonian period was much more militaristic than the first, the Neo- Babylonian civilization nevertheless still had an interest in the arts and sciences, like the first. This Neo-Babylonian period is also sometimes referred to as the Chaldean period.
The Neo-Babylonians also forged an empire in and around Iraq. One of the most famous Neo-Babylonian kings was Nebuchadnezzar.

After the fall of the Babylonian civilization, various empires swept through Iraq including the Persians, the Greeks, and the Romans.

It wasn’t until the Islamic period that Iraq regained its independence where it eventually became the center of civilization. By the time of the Abbasid dynasty (750-1258 AD), Baghdad had become the capital of the Islamic caliphate. The most famous Abbasid caliph was Harun Ar-Rasheed.

During the Abbasid period, Iraq was the center of learning and trade around the world. This golden era saw the development of universities, medical research, arts, and the sciences. Many students of learning around the world (even Europeans) traveled to Iraq to study there. Many merchants flocked to Iraq to buy and sell goods.

After the fall of Baghdad in 1258 by the Mongols, Iraq sunk into chaos, bloodshed, backwardness, and neglect. It wasn’t until the Ottomans conquered Iraq in the 1500’s that peace and order was re-established in Iraq. Ottoman rule over Iraq lasted until World War I (1914-1918) when Britain conquered Iraq.

After the British conquered much of the Middle East, they re-drew much of the boundaries not according to the Ottoman rule or to ethnic lines, but rather according to strategic adjectives and various political agreements with France (such as the Sykes-Picot Agreement).

As a result, much of the border issues that developed later in the twentieth century, such as between Iraq and Kuwait, between Iran and Iraq, and even between Syria and Turkey, were results of the British and French colonial powers drawing of the borders.

The British established a kingdom in Iraq in 1921 and ruled under a mandate granted by the League of Nations. Britain chose the Hashemite family from Mecca (now in Saudi Arabia) to be the royal family in Iraq. The first king of Iraq was Faisal bin Hussein.

Britain then granted Iraq its official independence in 1932, but with a special Anglo-Iraq Treaty guaranteeing Britain that Iraq could never adopt any policy deemed “unfavorable” to the British.
Iraq became a constitutional monarchy with two houses of parliament, a nominated senate or House of Appointees and an elected House of Representatives. The members of the House of Appointees were appointed by the king, while the members of the House of Representatives were elected by the citizens.

Iraq's policies were closely aligned with Britain. After the sudden death of King Faisal I in 1933, he was succeeded by his young son, Ghazi. Ghazi was more of an Arab nationalist and began to distinguish his rule from his father by distancing himself from Britain. He also planned to build a huge port in the neighboring Kuwait which was under British rule. He also supported the Palestinian resistance to the British rule and Zionist plans for Palestine. King Ghazi ruled from 1933 until 1939, when he was killed in an automobile crash. Many later accused the British for killing the king and the British consulate was attacked in Mosul.

Since King Ghazi’s son, Faisal II was still a boy at the time of his death, Faisal’s uncle, Abdel-Ilah ruled on his behalf, as the Regent. Abdel-Ilah realigned Iraq's policies closer to Britain. For the brief exception of 1941 where the Prime Minister Rashid Ali Al-Gailani revolted and rebelled against the British, most of the period under Abdel-Ilah's rule (1939-1953) saw close ties with Britian.  In 1948, Iraq sent army units to fight along the other Arab nations to protect the Palestinian areas after the Zionists declared the nation of Israel on areas it took over in Palestine. The Iraqi Army was famed for defending the West Bank areas from the Zionist forces.

After turning 18, Faisal II officially was crowned king in 1953. During this period Faisal II began to build closer ties with the United States. The King visited the United States and met with President Eisenhower. Many felt that Iraq was moving away from Britain in favor of the U.S. In February of 1958, Iraq and Jordan officially became united into one nation, called the Hashemite Union. Iraq also founded the Baghdad Pact with neighboring nations Iran and Turkey as a bulwark against Communism. 

Later that year (July, 1958), Hashemite rule was overthrown in Iraq by local army officers in a bloody revolution. Both King Faisal II and Crown Prince Abdel-Ilah were killed.

The union with Jordan was summarily dissolved. Both houses of parliament (House of Appointees and House of Representatives) were dissolved. Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad Pact.

Iraq ceased to be a kingdom in 1958, and although it was officially called a republic, it was not functionally set up as a republic. Rather, the presidency was a powerless three-man council, whereby the prime minister held all the real power. There was no parliament.

The leader of the 1958 revolution was Army General Abdel-Karim Qassim, who became the prime minister. His second in command was Army officer Abdel-Salam Arif. Qassim and Arif later split due to their political differences. Arif was an Arab nationalist, where Qassim was Iraq-centered. Arif was later arrested, tried, and released.

Qassim made many changes to the governmental institutions and civil law. He also realigned Iraq's foreign policy from the Western nations to the Soviet bloc nations. He also made claims on neighboring Kuwait in 1962. Premier Qassim was later overthrown and killed in another bloody revolution in March of 1963, also led by army officers.

After 1963, Iraq later became functionally more like a republic, where the power was transferred from the prime minister to the president.

The leader of the 1963 revolution was General Abdel-Salam Arif, who later became the president. His second in command was Army officer Ahmed Hassan Al-Bakr, who was also the leader of the Arab Baath Socialist Party, an Arab ultra-nationalist party. Arif became the President and Bakr became the prime minister. Arif, fearing a takeover by the Baath Party, later in November of 1963 moved against the Baathists including Bakr. Arif realigned Iraq's foreign policies to be closer with Egypt and Syria. Arif also improved the relations with the U.S. President Arif was killed in a helicopter crash in 1966, and was succeeded by his brother General Abdel-Rahman Arif.  He was known to be very mild mannered and freed many political prisoners. Iraq participated in the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, and cut ties with the U.S. as a result of that war. President Arif was later overthrown in July of 1968, in yet another revolution, also led by army officers.

The leader of the 1968 revolution was General Ahmed Hassan Al-Bakr, who became the president. Although there were different non-party officers involved in the 1968 revolution, the Baath Party moved against them and ruled the country alone. The party ruled the country for almost 35 years.

After the 1968 revolution, the army officers established a Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) as the chief executive authority in the country. The president of the republic has also been the chairman of the RCC.

In 1972, Iraq nationalized all its oil resources, which were previously controlled by foreign multinational oil companies. In 1973, Iraq sent army units to neighboring Syria to participate in the Arab-Israeli war. The Iraqi Army was famed for defending the Syrian capital of Damascus from Israeli occupation.

As the vice-chairman of the RCC at the time, Saddam Hussein began consolidating his power base in the government. He was instrumental in granting autonomy rights to the Kurdish minority in the north in 1974. Saddam also engineered the deal with the Shah of Iran to end the border dispute and the insurgency in the north in 1975. Saddam gradually became the real power in the government. President Al-Bakr resigned from his posts in 1979, citing poor health, although many feel he was pushed out of power. Saddam became the chairman of the RCC and the president of Iraq.

Also in 1979, after the Iranian revolution, the leader in Tehran Ayatollah Khomeini called for the overthrow of the Iraqi government and border clashes erupted in 1980.  Iraq fought a major war with Iran for eight years (1980-1988) over several issues, including a political struggle for dominance of the region and some border issues dating back to British colonial times.

In 1990, Iraq conquered its southern neighbor Kuwait over many political, economic, and strategic issues, and to a lesser degree, a few border issues, also dating back to the British colonial period. The United Nations place a comprehensive trade ban on Iraq, as a result.

In 1991, a coalition of almost thirty nations, including the United States, Britain, and France, led a devastating war against Iraq. That war destroyed Iraq's civilian infrastructure (electricity, water, sewage treatment, etc). Iraq was forced to withdraw from Kuwait in 1991.

Iraq is still suffering from the effects of the devastation of the 1991 Gulf War and the almost 13-year UN embargo, which prevented Iraq from rebuilding its electric power grid, water pumping stations, sewage treatment plants, schools, hospitals, etc.

On March 19, 2003, the U.S. led a massive invasion of Iraq from neighboring Kuwait, on the claim that Iraq still had banned weapons. The UN Security Council refused to authorize any military action against Iraq due to the lack of evidence that Iraq violated any UN resolution, and the fact that Iraq was in fact cooperating with UN Weapons Inspectors.

The massive U.S. and British military assualt on Iraq severly overwhelmed the Iraqi military, and the Baghdad government completely collapsed on April 9, 2003.

The fact that Iraq did not use any of the supposed banned weapons it was accused of having, added to the fact that even after several months of a massive U.S.-UK military occupation, no banned weapons were ever found in Iraq, it became quite clear that Iraq in fact did not have these weapons. The pretext for the invasion was in fact just that, a pretext. Later after the 2003 invasion and occupation, the Bush Administration admitted that in fact there were no supposed weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

The U.S. and British forces established military rule over Iraq, under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Although the CPA established an Interim Iraqi Council, the CPA held all the power and issued all the laws and decrees. The first head of the CPA was retired General Jay Garner. He was soon replaced by Ambassador Paul Bremer, who became the defacto ruler of Iraq until June of 2004.

In June of 2004, nominal sovereignty was handed over to Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, a secularist, who formed a cabinet of mixed religious and secular parties, to over see the first set of elections in January of 2005. The result of the January elections, which was boycotted by an important segment of society, was used to form an interim government to over see the writing of a constitution, hold a plebiscite, and conduct final elections in December 2005 for a permanent government.

After the January 2005 interim elections, Prime Minister Allawi handed power to Ibrahim Al-Ashayqar, who went by the title of "Jaafari." Jaafari, from the religious Al-Dawa Party, formed a new cabinet and ruled over a period which saw the drafting of the constitution and the elections of December 2005.

In the spring of 2006, due to opposition from other parties and coalitions in the new parliament for poor performance, Premier Jaafari was forced to hand over power to another colleague in the Dawa Party, Nuri Kamil Al-Maliki. Maliki then proceeded to form a new cabinet based on the parliament's various new coalitions.

Later after years of sectarian policies polarizing the communities in Iraq and massive demonstrations throughout the central and northern cities, calls for Al-Maliki to resign became un-ignore-able. In 2014, after the parliamentary elections, Al-Maliki's Dawa Party was forced to pick another candidate to become prime minister. The party picked Haidar Al-Abadi, who formed a new government. The Dawa Party has ruled Iraq for almost ten years. In addition, after President Jalal Talabani suffered a stroke, Fuad Masum was picked to become the president.

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Militias Detain Sunni Youths and Destroy Homes in Tikrit

Militia Abuses Against Sunnis in Tikrit--Human Rights Watch Report

(9/24/15) – Once again the sectarian militias in Iraq are killing, arresting young Sunni men and destroying homes belonging to Sunni residents, this time in city of Tikrit. With brutal savagery, these anti-Sunni militias once again commit crimes in the name of "fighting terrorism" by killing, detaining, or otherwise expelling Sunni residents in the Iraqi city of Tikrit.   Here Human Rights Watch documents the abuses in their report.

 

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SEPTEMBER 20, 2015

Iraq: Militia Abuses Mar Fight Against ISIS

Tikrit Homes Destroyed, Residents Abducted

(Washington) – Iraqi government-backed militias carried out widespread destruction of homes and shops around the city of Tikrit in March and April 2015 in violation of the laws of war, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today. Militiamen deliberately destroyed several hundred civilian buildings with no apparent military reason after the withdrawal of the extremist armed group Islamic State, also known as ISIS, from the area.

The 60-page report, “Ruinous Aftermath: Militia Abuses Following Iraq’s Recapture of Tikrit,” uses satellite imagery to corroborate accounts of witnesses that the damage to homes and shops in Tikrit, and the towns of al-Bu ‘Ajil, al-Alam, and al-Dur covered entire neighborhoods. After ISIS fled, Hizbollah Battalions and League of Righteous forces, two of the largely Shia pro-government militias, abducted more than 200 Sunni residents, including children, near al-Dur, south of Tikrit. At least 160 of those abducted remain unaccounted for.

“Iraqi authorities need to discipline and hold accountable the out-of-control militias laying waste to Sunni homes and shops after driving ISIS out,” said Joe Stork, deputy Middle East director. “Abusive militias and their commanders acting with impunity undermine the campaign against ISIS and put all civilians at greater risk.”

Ahead of the campaign, Shia militia leaders had promised revenge for the June 2014 massacre by ISIS of at least 770 Shia military cadets from the Camp Speicher facility, near Tikrit. In videos of home demolitions, Shia militiamen curse Sunni residents and invoke Shia slogans.

The militias are part of the Popular Mobilization Forces, consisting of several dozen Shia militias, which the government created in response to the rapid ISIS advance across Nineveh and Salah al-Din provinces in June 2014.

The militias receive government salaries and weaponry but act in loose coordination with one another and with the Iraqi army and other security forces. On April 7, the Iraqi cabinet recognized the Popular Mobilization Forces as a distinct security force under Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s command.

Satellite imagery corroborated witness accounts that destruction of buildings occurred primarily after pro-government forces had routed ISIS and the Iraqi army left the area to militia control. Damage from government and US-led coalition airstrikes and artillery or by ISIS during its nine-month rule prior to March was limited.

In one example, Iraqi troops and Shia militias recaptured al-Dur, a town of about 120,000 people 20 kilometers south of Tikrit, without a major battle on March 6, residents told Human Rights Watch. The army withdrew a day later, leaving the town in the hands of the militias. Almost all residents had fled under ISIS or shortly before government forces retook the town. On March 8, Al-Ittijah Channel broadcast footage of Hizbollah Battalions entering the town and defusing ISIS-planted explosive devices and showing al-Dur’s main street, roundabout, and other locations largely intact.

But when local policemen returned to duty in early April they compiled a list of over 600 torched or exploded homes and shops. Satellite imagery taken in May shows large swathes of al-Dur residential areas destroyed. Sheikh Malik Shahhab, a prominent businessman and brother of al-Dur’s mayor, told Human Rights Watch that a member of the Popular Mobilization Forces boasted, “We burned and destroyed al-Dur, because they [the residents] are ISIS and Baathists.”

On March 8, Shia militias and local volunteer fighters retook the town of al-Alam, about 12 kilometers northeast of Tikrit, with a population of about 60,000. Human Rights Watch collected photographs and witness accounts for 28 buildings torched or blown up after the recapture of al-Alam. Some of this destruction is visible on satellite imagery, which shows 45 buildings that had been destroyed in March and April after militia forces captured al-Alam. Local Sunni volunteer fighters who had opposed ISIS control and who were operating under Shia militia protection were responsible for the destruction in al-Alam.

The battle for the city of Tikrit, 180 kilometers north of Baghdad with a peacetime population of about 150,000, lasted from early March until April 1, when Prime Minister al-Abadi declared victory, although sporadic fighting continued. Residents told Human Rights Watch that heavy fighting was largely restricted to the northern Qadisiyya neighborhood, where several hundred homes had been destroyed after militias had routed ISIS.

In Tikrit, militias also engaged in significant looting. Muhammad Jasim, a businessman who runs a large appliance store, showed Human Rights Watch photographs of militias looting and torching his store. In one video, shot on March 31, a white truck is visible in front of Jasim’s store while men in fatigues load up appliances.

Witnesses said Shia militias also carried out apparent extrajudicial killings in Tikrit. A local policeman said that when he patrolled an area of the Qadisiyya neighborhood in early April, he saw two dozen ISIS fighters surrender to Badr Brigades, another Shiite militia, and the League of the Righteous because they were out of ammunition and food. The policeman said he then saw militia members execute some ISIS prisoners on the street. On April 3, Reuters correspondents reporting from Tikrit said they witnessed Federal Police officers stabbing to death a suspected ISIS fighter.

As the biggest contributors to Iraq’s military and security forces, the US and Iran should speak out against militia abuses and make clear that the government is responsible for stopping these abuses and holding those responsible accountable, regardless of rank, Human Rights Watch said. All countries providing military assistance to Iraq should strengthen end-use monitoring of equipment and human rights vetting of recipients, including by publicly reporting on investigations into misuse of assistance and steps taken to address it. These states should support establishing centralized command and control with civilian oversight over the militias and hold those responsible for laws of war violations accountable. Failure by Iraq to do so within one year should lead to suspensions of assistance commensurate with Iraq’s failure to comply.

“Revenge and collective punishment shouldn’t be seen as any part of the strategy for defeating ISIS,” Stork said. “Iraq needs to ensure individual accountability for crimes, whether by Sunni extremists or Shia militiamen.”

https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/09/20/iraq-militia-abuses-mar-fight-against-isis

Ruinous Aftermath

Militias Abuses Following Iraq’s Recapture of Tikrit

In March and April 2015, the Iraqi government achieved a significant military victory against the Islamic State, also known as ISIS, when its forces dislodged the extremist armed group from the city of Tikrit and other areas of Salah al-Din governorate, northeast of Baghdad. The forces involved in these operations included the Iraqi army and Federal Police, government-backed militias, and aerial support provided by an international coalition led by the United States.

In the aftermath of the fighting, militia forces looted, torched, and blew up hundreds of civilian houses and buildings in Tikrit and the neighboring towns of al-Dur, al-Bu ‘Ajil and al-Alam along the Tigris River, in violation of the laws of war. They also unlawfully detained some 200 men and boys, at least 160 of whom remain unaccounted for and are feared to have been forcibly disappeared.

The largely Shia militias responsible for the brutal aftermath to the fighting included the Badr Brigades, the Ali Akbar Brigades, the League of the Righteous (Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq), the Hizbollah Battalions (Kata’ib Hizbollah), the Khorasan Companies (Saraya Khorasan), and the Soldier of the Imam (Jund al-Imam). In the town of al-Alam, local Sunni volunteer forces carried out the destruction. Together, these militia forces make up the so-called Popular Mobilization Forces (al-Hashd al-Sha’bi), created in response to ISIS’s takeover of the northern city of Mosul on June 10, 2014.

The pattern of unlawful destruction is similar to that carried out by some of the same militias around the town of Amerli in Salah al-Din governorate during a three-month period from September to December 2014, after breaking the ISIS siege of Amerli.

Human Rights Watch investigations found no lawful military justification for the mass destruction of houses in Tikrit and surrounding areas. Before the operations, in February 2015, Qais al-Khaz’ali, leader of the Shia League of the Righteous, told a large crowd that he “promises victory in the battles [in Salah al-Din,] to take revenge and establish justice.” Some prominent Shia Iraqis alleged that many Sunni residents had made common cause with ISIS forces that had taken over their region and therefore shared responsibility for the June 2015 massacre by ISIS of up to 1,700 Shia military cadets from Camp Speicher, just north of Tikrit.

In December 2014, following international criticism of militia abuses during the operations to retake the town of Amerli, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi promised to bring the militias—formally part of the Popular Mobilization Forces but in practice independent actors—under state control. The massive unlawful destruction of houses following the recapture of Tikrit shows that reining in the militias and holding accountable those responsible for crimes remains an urgent priority. The Iraqi cabinet on April 7 formally recognized the Popular Mobilization Forces as state security forces directly responsible to the prime minister, who is commander-in-chief, but Iraqi authorities have not made available any details indicating increased command responsibility and very limited accountability for past crimes.

Reasserting the authority of government institutions over areas now under militia control is crucial to persuading tens of thousands of displaced Sunnis from Salah al-Din to return to their homes. While the first few thousand residents have returned to Tikrit, residents from al-Dur and al-Bu ‘Ajil have not yet done so. Those interviewed told Human Rights Watch that they were fearful of further militia retaliation, and without a governmental rebuilding plan many have no home to return to.

***

The extensive destruction of property documented in this report was preceded by grave abuses that ISIS perpetrated during its nine-month rule over these areas, beginning in June 2014.

On June 12, 2014, ISIS forces systematically executed several hundred Shia army recruits stationed at Camp Speicher. Human Rights Watch interviewed a survivor and, using ISIS videos and satellite imagery, located three sites where the killings took place and determined that the number killed was at least between 560 and 770; ISIS claimed they had killed 1,700 men. According to residents from Tikrit and the surrounding areas interviewed for this report and ISIS footage, ISIS forces also executed dozens of local residents accused of being spies for the Iraqi government in Tikrit city, al-Dur, and al-Alam.

Even before its takeover of Tikrit and the surrounding area, ISIS engaged in extortion from business people and assassinated state security officers. After ISIS took control, its operatives demanded “repentance” from serving security officers in exchange for promising to remove them from their list of wanted persons. ISIS established its version of Sharia (Islamic law) courts, whose judges imposed death sentences without a semblance of fair trials. Transgressors who smoked or whose female family members did not veil properly received lashings.

ISIS forces had entered Tikrit and surrounding towns without a fight raising suspicions in Baghdad that local residents were complicit with the group. Some residents told Human Rights Watch that many of them did indeed initially welcome ISIS because of years of alienation from the Shia-dominated government of former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. But they said people quickly fell out with ISIS, and by February 2015 the majority had left their towns.

As a matter of international law, the destruction meted out in the aftermath of the recapture of Tikrit and nearby towns was illegal regardless of the attitude of the population towards ISIS or past activities of individuals.

In Tikrit city and al-Bu ‘Ajil as well as in the nearby towns of al-Dur and al-Alam, satellite imagery analysis corroborated residents’ accounts of large-scale destruction after the defeat of ISIS. ISIS had destroyed some buildings before they were pushed out and some buildings were destroyed or damaged during military clashes. After the recapture of the area Iraqi government forces and militias used technical teams to defuse or blow up what they said were hundreds of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that ISIS placed on roads and in buildings to slow their advance. Some damage may therefore be attributed to setting off these IEDs. However the scale and nature of the destruction, with scores of entire houses collapsed, point to the use of more powerful explosives used in a systematic way.

Based on a time-series analysis of eight satellite images recorded from December 28, 2014 to May 26, 2015, Human Rights Watch identified a total of at least 1,425 buildings likely destroyed by forces of pro-government militias in Tikrit and al-Bu ‘Ajil, and in al-Dur and al-Alam in the aftermath of the recapture of the area. Of this total, approximately 950 buildings were likely demolished with high explosives and a further 400 destroyed by fire.

Because fire-related damages often are limited to building interiors that cannot be identified in satellite imagery, it is likely that the total number of buildings damaged or destroyed by fire in the towns Human Rights Watch assessed with satellite imagery have been significantly underestimated. This observation is further supported by the extensive number of photographs obtained by Human Rights Watch that show multiple instances of severe fire damage to the interior of residential and commercial buildings that Human Rights Watch has been able to identify and locate.

The visual signatures of buildings destroyed with high explosives (as identified in satellite imagery) included the complete structural collapse (“pancaking”) of large, multi-story concrete buildings, generally intact rooftops, and large debris fields. These signatures are consistent with the detonation of high explosives in quantities substantially larger than typically deployed in IEDs widely used by ISIS.

Al-Dur

Starting on March 6, Iraqi armed forces quickly took over al-Dur, south of Tikrit, with little ISIS armed resistance, according to local residents. The army advanced north toward al-Bu ‘Ajil the next day. A video showing the arrival of the Hizbollah Battalions, one of the Shia militias, in al-Dur on March 8 shows largely intact buildings along the main street. Satellite imagery taken at intervals beginning on March 9 shows large areas of the town destroyed. Satellite imagery recorded on May 26 shows evidence of the widespread destruction of over 400 buildings in residential neighborhoods of al-Dur, including the Salah al-Din Residential Complex in southern al-Dur.

Residents and local policemen who returned to al-Dur three weeks after its capture described to Human Rights Watch scenes of destruction, including arson and the blowing up of shops and homes. A group of four al-Dur residents provided Human Rights Watch with a list of 520 houses demolished, 430 torched houses, and 95 damaged shops. Human Rights Watch separately obtained photographs of 40 destroyed homes.

Al-Dur residents identified the Hizbollah Battalions as mainly responsible for the destruction.

Although ISIS had destroyed some properties and artillery shelling and coalition aerial bombing caused further damage, residents’ comments and satellite and video imagery indicate that the damage from these causes was limited. The destruction visible on satellite images and photos from after the militia takeover is consistent with accounts of homes destroyed by high explosives, rather than air-dropped bombs or artillery.

Given the absence of ISIS forces, and no perceived risk of imminent counter-attack, there was no discernible military necessity for the large-scale destruction of property that took place following the takeover of al-Dur.

Al-Alam

In al-Alam, a few kilometers north of Tikrit on the eastern bank of the Tigris River, Sunni local volunteer fighters operating under the protection of Shia militias blew up and torched about three dozen houses, according to tribal leaders and local residents.

The local tribal council in al-Alam (composed of Sunnis), in a public declaration, stated: “The sons of al-Alam themselves carried out the destruction of houses” of people suspected of collaboration with ISIS. A leader of the volunteer fighters told Human Rights Watch that these home demolitions occurred in a different area from those carried out by ISIS months earlier.

The 28 destroyed homes for which Human Rights Watch obtained information lie in a southern rural subdistrict of al-Alam called al-Ali, an area that local residents said played a significant role in the battle for al-Alam in June 2014. Al-Ali lies between a southern point of the town that al-Alam residents tried to defend against ISIS, and a northern point, to which the local fighters receded after accusing local residents of enabling the ISIS advance.

Local fighters destroyed the houses of several al-Ali residents, even though they had left soon after ISIS took control of al-Alam in June 2014 and had not since returned. Branded as ISIS collaborators with their houses destroyed, al-Ali residents who spoke with Human Rights Watch said they remained fearful of returning and facing personal attacks.

Human Rights Watch examined satellite imagery recorded in March, April and May after militia forces captured al-Alam and found evidence that at least 45 buildings were destroyed during this period, including those properties of local residents interviewed by Human Rights Watch that were demolished or exhibited arson damage visible from space in satellite imagery. Of this total, 30 buildings were likely demolished with high explosives and a further 15 destroyed by fire consistent with arson.

Tikrit

The battle to oust ISIS from the city of Tikrit lasted all of March, and sporadic fighting continued even after Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi declared victory on April 1. The US-led coalition bombed parts of the city during the campaign to drive out ISIS and residents said that ISIS forces also destroyed buildings.

Satellite imagery as well as publicly available US and Iraqi aircraft videos reviewed by Human Rights Watch corroborated residents’ accounts that most building destruction in the weeks before the recapture of the city was limited to specific areas of the city, and was the result of targeting mostly military objectives, specifically buildings in and adjacent to the presidential palaces which ISIS occupied earlier in June 2014. Human Rights Watch identified over 75 distinct impact sites in Tikrit with signatures consistent with the use of large, air-dropped munitions occurring between early February and late March 2015.

Human Rights Watch reviewed satellite imagery recorded on March 21 and on April 5—the period in which Iraqi military and allied forces captured the city—and found evidence of 75 destroyed residential buildings destroyed in this period in the al-Qadisiyya neighborhood in northern Tikrit, home to present and retired Iraqi military officers and an ISIS stronghold in the battle for the city. All of the buildings had damage signatures consistent with the use of large quantities of high explosives, and contextual analysis, including the number of coalition sorties during that period and the proximity of the 75 destroyed buildings to others destroyed later, suggests their demolition by explosives on the ground.

Satellite imagery recorded on May 26, less than two months after the defeat of ISIS in Tikrit, shows an additional 90 residential buildings were likely demolished with high explosives in the same area of al-Qadisiyya, sometime after the morning of April 5.

A local security guard who returned on April 2 said he counted more than 200 houses destroyed, and many more stores burned and looted in the two weeks of his deployment throughout Tikrit. Much of the destruction took place in the northern Qadisiyya neighborhood. Two police officers told Human Rights Watch they personally witnessed militias torching private homes after clashes with ISIS had ended.

Officials and residents in Tikrit also alleged that the militias were involved in widespread looting and extrajudicial killings. A policeman told Human Rights Watch that he witnessed some two dozen ISIS fighters surrender in Qadisiyya. He said forces of the Badr Brigades and the League of the Righteous separated the prisoners into groups, and each militia executed some of them on the spot. His account reflects similar events elsewhere in the city at the same time. On April 3, Reuters correspondents also witnessed an extrajudicial killing by Federal Police officers.

Human Rights Watch identified 75 separate smoke plumes from active building fires in the district of al-Bu ‘Ajil, which lies on the other side of the Tigris from Tikrit, in satellite imagery recorded on the mornings of March 9, 10 and 11, 2015, consistent with allegations of a widespread campaign of arson. In at least seven separate locations in al-Bu ‘Ajil, Human Rights Watch further identified large concentrations of mixed civilian and military vehicles (possibly including main battle tanks and armored personnel carriers) in the immediate vicinity of active building fires and freshly demolished buildings on the mornings of March 9, 10 and 11, evidence of the active presence of militia and government military forces at the time of widespread arson and building demolitions.

Arbitrary Detention and Enforced Disappearance

Human Rights Watch received accounts of militias or government forces arbitrarily detaining persons in Jallam al-Dur, a rural area east of al-Dur, where some remaining residents of al-Dur had fled just before the entry of government and allied forces. Two people described to Human Rights Watch the apprehension and detention of some 200 men and boys around March 8 by the Hizbollah Battalions and the League of the Righteous. At time of writing, more than 160 of the men and boys remained missing and unaccounted for, and appear to have been forcibly disappeared.

The government has not responded to calls by Dhiya al-Duri, a local member of parliament, to investigate the whereabouts of these men and boys.

***

The large-scale destruction of civilian property by pro-government militias detailed in this report was in apparent violation of international humanitarian law—the laws of war. The laws of war prohibit deliberate attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects not being used at the time for military purposes. The laws of war specifically prohibit the destruction of the property of an adversary, unless required by the imperative of military necessity. Human Rights Watch found no evidence that the destruction met the requirements for military necessity, but instead occurred after fighting had concluded in the area and when ISIS had fled, and renewed fighting was not imminent.

Serious violations of the laws of war committed with criminal intent are war crimes. Possible war crimes include unlawful destruction of property, collective punishment, and forced displacement. Those responsible include not only direct participants in the criminal acts but commanders implicated as a matter of command responsibility.

The Iraqi government’s failure to disband or establish effective command and control over the militias and bring those responsible for unlawful property destruction and other abuses to justice has had grave consequences. It signals to the Sunni residents of these areas that their fear of returning to an area under unchecked rule of militias is justified. It also bodes ill for the communities of Anbar and Nineveh province now under abusive ISIS rule, since Prime Minister Abadi has ordered the Popular Mobilization Forces to take part in the campaign to retake these provinces.

The United Nations as well as the United States, Iran, and other countries involved in the conflict in Iraq should publicly condemn militia abuses in the armed conflict with ISIS and press the Iraqi government to fully and impartially investigate alleged war crimes by militia forces. The UN Human Rights Council should extend the mandate of its fact-finding commission and include militia abuses.

In light of abuses by Iraqi pro-government militias documented in this report and elsewhere, the United States, Iran and other countries providing military assistance to Iraq should urge and support Iraq to undertake concrete and verifiable reforms to hold perpetrators of serious abuses accountable, integrate pro-government militias into a centralized command structure subject to civilian oversight and control, and ensure that those forces fully adhere to international humanitarian law. These countries should require Iraq to report publicly within one year on progress towards implementing these reforms, after which they should suspend military assistance and sales commensurate with Iraqi compliance gaps on those reforms.

Recommendations

To the Iraqi Government

• Take immediate steps to establish effective command and control over pro-government militias; disband militias that resist government control;
• Ensure that members of the Iraqi security forces, including all militias, implicated in violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law, are fairly and appropriately disciplined or prosecuted. This includes military commanders and civilian officials responsible for abuses as a matter of command responsibility;
• Immediately take all necessary steps to end unlawful destruction of and damage to houses and other civilian property for whatever reason by militias and state security forces;
• Provide adequate compensation or alternative housing to residents whose homes have been unlawfully destroyed by Iraqi security forces or pro-government militias;
• Ensure humanitarian agencies have prompt and unfettered access to all civilians in need, including those in urgent need of housing;
• Facilitate immediate and unhindered access to all government-controlled areas, including those held by militias, to journalists, independent human rights monitors, and UN agencies, including the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Council Investigative Committee on Iraq;
• Accede to the Rome Statute so that grave crimes in violation of international law committed in Iraq fall under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Iraq should also file an article 12(3) declaration under the Rome Statute to give the ICC retroactive jurisdiction.

To the UN Human Rights Council

• Extend the current mandate of the Investigative Committee on Iraq and ensure it includes violations of the laws of war and human rights abuses committed by all sides, not only by ISIS and associated groups;
• Establish a mandate of Special Rapporteur on the situation in Iraq, in order to monitor the grave situation of human rights in the country and make recommendations on measures to prevent violations and ensure accountability.

To the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

• Support prompt and thorough investigations by the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq into alleged war crimes committed by all parties to the conflict and support the publication of its findings and recommendations in a timely fashion.

To the United States, Iran, and Other Countries Providing Military Assistance or Sales to Iraq

• Urge Iraq to undertake concrete and verifiable reforms to bring an end to serious militia abuses by holding perpetrators of serious human rights violations accountable; progressively integrating the militias into a centralized command structure, subject to civilian oversight and control; and ensuring that those forces fully adhere to international humanitarian law;
• Require Iraq to report publicly in one year on progress towards implementing these reforms, after which suspend military assistance and sales commensurate with Iraqi compliance gaps on those reforms;
• Amend relevant legislation authorizing and appropriating security assistance and military sales or transfers to Iraq to ensure, with no waiver language, that it provides for:
• Reform benchmarks for the Iraqi government, such as integrating under central government command all militias operating outside the effective control of the Iraqi security forces; ending security force abuses, including enforced disappearances and torture; and releasing prisoners held on politically motivated counterterrorism charges;
• Explicit end-user documentation and post-shipment controls to minimize the transfer of weapons and equipment to abusive forces;
• Clear vetting of recipients of security assistance to exclude those with credible indications of involvement in serious abuses;
• Ensure that embassies of arms-providing countries in Iraq have sufficient financial, technical, and personnel resources to undertake robust human rights vetting of all recipients of military aid, foreign military sales, and security assistance and that the ambassador, defense attaches and political counselors undertake regular joint monitoring visits to security force training sites to assess training effectiveness, including on human rights;
• Publicly report on the end-use of military transfers and vetting of forces participating in training, including end-users involvement in violations of human rights or international humanitarian law, and any steps taken to address this;
• Countries and UN agencies providing financial assistance or expertise for security sector reform in Iraq, including accountability for past abuses, should publicly report on their goals related to human rights and international humanitarian law, means of measuring progress, and evaluations of future support should those goals not be met;
• Urge Iraq to join the International Criminal Court or to voluntarily accept temporary jurisdiction of the court over the current situation.

Full Report:

https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/iraq0915_4up_0.pdf

التقرير باللغة العربية

https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/iraq0915arweb.pdf